Anonymous messaging platforms, such as Secret, Yik Yak, and Whisper, have emerged as important social media for sharing one's thoughts without the fear of being judged by friends, family, or the public. Further, such anonymous platforms are crucial in nations with authoritarian governments; the right to free expression and sometimes the personal safety of the author of the message depend on anonymity. Whether for fear of judgment or personal endangerment, it is crucial to keep anonymous the identity of the user who initially posted a sensitive message. In this paper, we consider an adversary who observes a snapshot of the spread of a message at a certain time. Recent advances in rumor source detection shows that the existing messaging protocols are vulnerable against such an adversary. We introduce a novel messaging protocol, which we call adaptive diffusion, and show that it spreads the messages fast and achieves a perfect obfuscation of the source when the underlying contact network is an infinite regular tree: all users with the message are nearly equally likely to have been the origin of the message. Experiments on a sampled Facebook network show that it effectively hides the location of the source even when the graph is finite, irregular and has cycles.
INTRODUCTION
Microblogging platforms form a core aspect of the fabric of the present Internet; popular examples include Twitter and Facebook. Users propagate short messages (texts, images, Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. SIGMETRICS '15, June 15-19, 2015 videos) through the platform via local friendship links. The forwarding of messages often occurs through built-in mechanisms that rely on user input, such as clicking "like" or "share" with regards to a particular post. Brevity of message, fluidity of user interface, and trusted party communication combine to make these microblogging platforms a major communication mode of modern times. There has been tremendous recent interest in the privacy implications of these platforms, as evidenced by the explosive growth of anonymous microblogging platforms, like Secret 1 [1], Whisper [2] , and Yik Yak [3] . These platforms enable users to share messages with friends without leaking the message author's identity. In such applications, it is crucial to hide the identity of the user who initially posted the message.
Existing anonymous messaging services store both messages and authorship information on centralized servers, which makes them vulnerable to government subpoenas, hacking, or direct company access. A more robust solution would be to store this information in a distributed fashion; each node would know only its own friends, and message authorship information would never be transmitted to any party. Distributed systems are more robust to monitoring due to lack of central points of failure. However, even under distributed architectures, simple anonymous messaging protocols (such as those used by commercial anonymous microblogging apps) are still vulnerable against an adversary with side information, as proved in recent advances in rumor source detection. In this work, we study in depth a basic building block of the messaging protocol that would underpin truly anonymous microblogging platform -broadcasting a single message on a contact network with the goal of obfuscating the source under strong adversarial conditions. Specifically, we consider contact networks that represent a social graph among users of the service.
A natural strategy for preventing source identification by an adversary would be to spread the message as fast as possible; with reliable connection to infrastructure like the Internet, this could be in principle done nearly instantaneously. If all users receive the message instantaneously, any user is equally likely to have been the source. However, this strategy is not available in many of the key real-life scenarios we are considering. For instance, in social networks, messages are spread based on users approving the message via liking, sharing or retweeting (to enable social filtering and also to avoid spamming) -this scenario naturally has inherent random delays associated with when the user happens to encounter the message and whether or not she decides to "like" the message. Indeed, standard models of rumor spreading in networks explicitly model such random delays via a diffusion process: messages are spread independently over different edges with a fixed probability of spreading (discrete time model) or an exponential time to spread (continuous time model). Related work. Anonymous communication has been a popular research topic for decades. For instance, anonymous point-to-point communication allows a sender to communicate with a receiver without the receiver learning the sender's identity. A great deal of successful work has emerged in this area, including Tor [8] , Freenet [5] , Free Haven [7] , and Tarzan [10] . In contrast to this body of work, we address the problem of anonymously broadcasting a message over an underlying contact network (e.g., a social network). Anonymous broadcast communication has been most studied in context of the dining cryptographers' (DC) problem. We diverge from the vast literature on this topic [4, 6, 11, 12, 23] in approach and formulation. We consider statistical spreading models rather than cryptographic encodings, accommodate computationally unbounded adversaries, and consider arbitrary network structures rather than a fully connected network.
Within the realm of statistical message spreading models, the problem of detecting the origin of an epidemic or the source of a rumor has been studied under the diffusion model. Recent advances in [20, 19, 24, 18, 9, 13, 25, 17, 16, 14, 15] show that it is possible to identify the source within a few hops with high probability. Drawing an analogy to epidemics, we refer to a person who has received the message as 'infected' and the act of passing the message as 'spreading the infection'. Consider an adversary who has access to the underlying contact network of friendship links and the snapshot of infected nodes at a certain time. The problem of locating a rumor source, first posed in [20] , naturally corresponds to graph-centrality-based inference algorithms: for a continuous time model, [20, 19] used the rumor centrality measure to correctly identify the source after time T (with probability converging to a positive number for large d-regular and random trees, and with probability proportional to 1/ √ T for lines). The probability of identifying the source increases even further when multiple infections from the same source are observed [24] . With multiple sources of infections, spectral methods have been proposed for estimating the number of sources and the set of source nodes in [18, 9] . When infected nodes are allowed to recover as in the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model, Jordan centrality was proposed in [13, 25] to estimate the source. In [25] , it is shown that the Jordan center is still within a bounded hop distance from the true source with high probability, independent of the number of infected nodes. Under natural and diffusion-based message spreading -as seen in almost every content-sharing platform today -an adversary with some side-information can identify the rumor source with high confidence. We overcome this vulnerability by asking the reverse question: can we design messaging protocols that spread fast while protecting the anonymity of the source?
Model. We focus on anonymous microblogging built atop an underlying contact network, such as a network of phone contacts or Facebook friends. In such systems, the designer has some control over the spreading rate, by introducing artificial delays on top of the usual random delays due to users' approval of the messages. We model this physical setup as a discrete-time system, where any individual receiving a message approves it immediately at the next timestep, at which point the protocol determines how much delay to introduce before sending the message to each of her uninfected neighbors. Given this control, the system designer wishes to design a spreading protocol that makes inference on the source of the message difficult. The assumption that all nodes are willing to approve and pass the message is not new. Such assumptions are common in the analysis of rumor spreading [20, 19, 25] , and our deviation from those standard models is that we are operating in discrete time and approvals are immediate. Adversary. Following the adversarial model assumed in prior work on rumor source detection [20, 19, 25] , we assume the adversary knows the whole underlying contact network and, at a certain time, it observes a snapshot of the state of all the nodes, i.e. who has received the message thus far. This adversary is strong in the sense that it sees the whole contact network as well as every node's state, but it is also limited in the sense that the adversary is not aware of when (or from whom) a particular node received the message. This model captures an adversary that is able to indirectly observe the contents of users' devices without actively compromising the devices; for instance, if the message in question contains the time and location of a protest, then the adversary learns a snapshot of the infection at a given point in time by observing who attends the protest. This adversarial model also captures an adversary that is able to monitor the network state more closely, but only at a high cost. As such, it cannot afford to continuously monitor state. We design a new anonymous messaging protocol, which we call adaptive diffusion, that is inherently distributed and provides strong anonymity guarantees under this adversarial model. We discuss other plausible adversarial models in Section 5. Spreading. At time t = 0, a single user v * ∈ V starts to spread a message on a contact network G = (V, E) where users and contacts are represented by nodes and edges, respectively. Upon receiving the message, a node can send the message to any of its neighbors. We assume a discrete-time system and model the delays due to user approval and intermittent network access via a deterministic delay of one time unit. Therefore, a message always propagates with a delay of at least one time unit. Our goal is to introduce appropriate random delays into the system in order to obfuscate the identity of the source v * . After T timesteps, let VT ⊆ V , GT , and NT |VT | denote the set of infected nodes, the subgraph of G containing only VT , and the number of infected nodes, respectively. At a certain time T , an adversary observes the infected subgraph GT and produces an estimatev of the source v * of the message (with probability of detection PD = P(v = v * )). Since the adversary is assumed to not have any prior information on which node is likely to be the source, we use the maximum likelihood estimatorv
(1) We wish to achieve the following performance metrics.
(a) We say a protocol has an order-optimal rate of spread if the expected time for the message to reach n nodes scales linearly compared to the time required by the fastest spreading protocol.
(b) We say a protocol achieves a perfect obfuscation if the probability of source detection for the maximum likelihood estimator conditioned on n nodes being infected is bounded by
Key insights. Figure 1 (left) illustrates an example of the spread when the message is propagated immediately upon reception. The source is indicated by a solid circle. This scheme spreads the message fast but the source is trivially identified as the center of the infected subgraph if the contact network is an infinite tree. This is true independent of the infection size. Even if we introduce some randomness at each node, the source will still be identified within a few hops. This is due to the fact that the source is close to some notion of the center of the infected subgraph [20, 25] . Since we do not know a priori when the adversary is going to attack, the main challenge is to ensure that the source is equally likely to be anywhere in the infection at any given time. Figure 1 (right) illustrates the main idea of our approach: we intentionally break the symmetry around the source. This is achieved by combining two insights illustrated in the two warm-up examples in Section 2. The first insight is that nodes farther away from the source should spread the infection faster. The second insight is that the spread should be coordinated in order to maintain a symmetric structure centered around a 'virtual source' node. This leads to the source node being anywhere in the infected subgraph with equal probability. Contributions. We introduce a novel messaging protocol, which we call adaptive diffusion, with provable author anonymity guarantees against strong adversaries. Our protocol is inherently distributed and spreads messages fast, i.e., the time it takes adaptive diffusion to reach n users is at most twice the time it takes the fastest spreading scheme which immediately passes the message to all its neighbors.
We further prove that adaptive diffusion provides perfect obfuscation of the source when applied to regular tree contact networks. The source hides perfectly within all infected users, i.e., the likelihood of an infected user being the source of the infection is equal among all infected users. For a more general class of graphs which can be finite, irregular and have cycles, we provide results of numerical experiments on realworld social networks and synthetic networks showing that the protocol hides the source at nearly the best possible level of obfuscation. Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. To warm up, we introduce, in Section 2, two messaging protocols customized for lines and trees. Combining the key insights of these two approaches, we introduce, in Section 3, a new messaging protocol called adaptive diffusion and analyze its performance theoretically and empirically, in Section 4. Section 5 discusses limitations and future work.
WARM-UP EXAMPLES
In this section, we discuss two special contact networks as warm-up examples: a line and a regular tree with degree larger than two. We provide two fully-distributed, customized messaging protocols, one for each case, and show that these protocols spread messages quickly while effectively hiding the source. However, these protocols fail to protect the identity of the source when applied to a broader class of contact networks. In particular, the "Line Protocol", which is developed for line contact networks, reveals the source with high probability when applied to a regular tree with degree larger than two. Similarly, the "Tree Protocol", developed for regular tree contact networks with degree greater than two, reveals the source with high probability when applied to a line. In Section 3, we introduce a novel messaging protocol, which we call adaptive diffusion, that combines the key ideas behind the two approaches presented in this section.
Spreading on a line
Given a contact network of an infinite line, consider the following deterministic spreading protocol. At time t = 1, the source node infects its left and right neighbors. At t ≥ 2, the leftmost and rightmost infected nodes spread the message to their uninfected neighbors. Thus, the message spreads one hop to the left and one hop to the right of the true source at each timestep. This scheme spreads as fast as possible, infecting NT = 2T + 1 nodes at time T , but the source is trivially identified as the center of the infection.
Adding a little bit of randomness can significantly decrease the probability of detection. Consider a discretetime random diffusion model with a parameter p ∈ (0, 1) where at each time t, an infected node infects its uninfected neighbor with probability p. Using the analysis from [20] where the continuous time version of this protocol was studied, we can show that this protocol spreads fast, infecting E[NT ] = 2pT + 1 nodes on average at time T . Further, the probability of source detection PD = P(vML = v * ) for the maximum likelihood estimator scales as 1/ p(1 − p)T . With p = 1/2 for example, this gives a simple messaging protocol with a probability of source detection vanishing at a rate of 1/ √ T . In what follows, we show that with an appropriate choice of time-dependent randomness, we can achieve almost perfect source obfuscation without sacrificing the spreading rate. The key insight is to add randomness such that all the infected nodes are (almost) equally likely to have been the origin of the infection (see Figure 2 and Equation (6)). This can be achieved by adaptively choosing the spreading rate such that the farther away the infection is from the source the more likely it is to spread. We now apply this insight to design precisely how fast the spread should be for each infected node at any timestep. A node v is designed to infect a neighbor at time t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} with probability
where δH (v, v * ) is the hop distance between an infected node v at the boundary of infection and the source v * . The details of this spreading model are summarized in Protocol 3 (Line Protocol).
The next proposition shows that this protocol achieves the two main goals of an anonymous messaging protocol: orderoptimal spreading rate and close-to-perfect obfuscation. (b) the probability of source detection at time T is upper bounded by
(c) the expected hop-distance between the true source v * and its estimatevML is lower bounded by
The proof of the above proposition can be found in Appendix B. Compared to the (fastest-spreading) deterministic spreading model with a spreading rate of NT = 2T + 1, The Line Protocol is slower by a factor of 2. This type of constant-factor loss in the spreading rate is inevitable: the only way to deviate from the deterministic spreading model is to introduce appropriate delays. The probability of de-
, which is almost perfect obfuscation up to a factor of 2. Further, the expected distance of the true source from the ML source estimate scales linearly with the size of the infection E[NT ], which is the best separation one can hope to achieve.
To illustrate the power of the Line Protocol, we consider a fixed T and a finite ring graph of size larger than 2T + 1, and compare the protocol to a simple random diffusion. If the source v * is chosen uniformly at random on the ring and its message is spread according to the Line Protocol, then the probability of the source being detected given a set of infected nodes VT is 
On an infinite line, the Line Protocol provides maximum protection, since the probability of detection scales as 1/E[NT ] for any T . When the Line Protocol is applied to regular trees with degree larger than two, the infected subgraph contains exponentially many paths starting at v * of length close to T . In such cases, the Jordan center (i.e., the node with the smallest maximum distance to every other node in the graph) matches the source with positive probability, as shown in Figure 3 for different d-regular trees.
Spreading on a regular tree
Consider the case when the underlying contact network is an infinite d-regular tree with d larger than two. Analogous to the line network, the fastest spreading protocol infects all the uninfected neighbors at each timestep. This spreads fast, infecting
nodes at time T , but the source is trivially identified as the center of the infected subtree. In this case, the infected subtree is a balanced regular tree where all leaves are at equal depth from the source. Now consider a random diffusion model. At each timestep, each uninfected neighbor of an infected node is independently infected with probability p. In this case,
, and it was shown in [20] that the probability of correct detection for the maximum likelihood estimator of the rumor source is P(vML = v * ) ≥ C d for some positive constant C d that only depends on the degree d. Hence, the source is only hidden in a constant number of nodes close to the center, even when the total number of infected nodes is arbitrarily large.
We now present a protocol that spreads the message fast
T /2 )) and hides the source within a constant fraction of the infected nodes (P(vML = v * ) = O(1/NT )). This protocol keeps the infected subtree balanced: at any time t, all the leaves of the infected subtree are at the same hop distance from its center. Further, as we will see next, the leaves of the infected subtree are equally likely to have been 
Figure 3: Detection probability versus the average size of infection on regular trees using Jordan center estimator, which is the ML estimate in case of a line (d = 2). For d > 2, the source is easily detected. Figure 4: Spreading on a tree. The red node is the message source. Yellow nodes denote nodes that have been, are, or will be the center of the infected subtree.
the source. Figure 4 illustrates how this protocol spreads a message on a regular tree of degree 3. At t = 1, node 0 (the message author) infects one of its neighbors (node 1 in this example) uniformly at random. Node 1 will be referred to as the virtual source at t = 1. The virtual source at time t is the center of the infected subtree at time 2t. At t = 2, node 1 infects all its uninfected neighbors, making the infected subgraph G2 a balanced tree with node 1 at the center. Among the uninfected neighbors of node 1, one node is chosen to be the new virtual source (node 2 in the example). The message then spreads to the uninfected neighbors of node 2 at time t = 3, and then to their neighbors at time t = 4 making G4 a balanced tree with node 2 at the center. Notice that any given time t, all leaves are equally likely to have been the source. This follows form the symmetric structure of Gt.
The distributed implementation of this spreading algorithm is given in Protocol 4 (Tree Protocol). The Tree Protocol ensures that the source can hide among the leaf nodes of the infected subtree, i.e. all leaves are equally likely to have been the source. Since a significant fraction of the infected nodes are at the leaf, this protocol achieves an almost perfect obfuscation. (a) the number of infected nodes at time T ≥ 1 is at least
(b) the probability of source detection for the maximum likelihood estimator at time T is
(c) the expected hop-distance between the true source v * and its estimatev is lower bounded by
The proof of the above proposition can be found in Appendix C. Equation (7) shows that the spreading rate of the Tree Protocol is O ((d − 1) T /2 ), which is slower than the deterministic spreading model that infects O ((d − 1) T ) nodes at time T . This is inevitable, as we explained in relation to the Line Protocol.
Although this protocol spreads fast and provides an almost perfect obfuscation on a tree with degree larger than two, it fails when the contact network is a line. There are only two leaves in a line, so at any given time T , the source can be detected with probability 1/2, independent of the size of the infected subgraph. Another drawback of this approach, is that even in the long run, not every node receives the message. For instance, the neighbors of the source node that are not chosen in the first step are never infected. In the following section, we address these issues and propose a new messaging protocol that combines the key ideas of both spreading models presented in this section.
ADAPTIVE DIFFUSION
Section 2 showed that by changing the infection rate and direction based on state variables, the source can hide from the adversary. In particular, the messaging protocols presented in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 provide provable anonymity guarantees for line graphs and d-regular trees with d > 2, respectively. However, the Line Protocol fails to protect the source on graphs with larger degree. Similarly, the Tree Protocol fails to protect the source on a line and does not pass the message to some of the nodes. To overcome these challenges, we use ideas from the Line Protocol (nodes farther away from the source spread message faster) and from the Tree Protocol (keep the infected subgraph balanced and keep the source closer to the leaves) to design a protocol that achieves perfect obfuscation and spreads fast on all regular trees, including lines. We call this protocol adaptive diffusion to emphasize the fact that unlike diffusion, the protocol adapts the infection rate and direction as a function of time.
We step through the intuition of the adaptive diffusion spreading model with an example, partially illustrated in Figure 5 . Suppose that the underlying contact network is an infinite d-regular tree. As illustrated in Figure 5 , we ensure that the infected subgraph Gt at any even timestep t ∈ {2, 4, . . .} is a balanced tree of depth t/2, i.e. the hop distance from any leaf to the root (or the center of the graph) is t/2. We call the root node of Gt the "virtual source" at time t, and denote it by vt. We use v0 = v * to denote the true source. To keep the regular structure at even timesteps, we use the odd timesteps to transition from one regular subtree Gt to another one Gt+2 with depth incremented by one. Figure 5 illustrates two sample evolutions of infection, as per adaptive diffusion. The source v * = 0 starts the infection at t = 0. At time t = 1, node 0 infects node 1 and passes the virtual source token to it, i.e. v2 = 1 (we only define virtual sources for even timesteps). At time t = 1, node 1 infects its uninfected neighbors, nodes 2 and 3. Notice that it requires two timesteps to infect nodes {1, 2, 3} in order to spread infection to G2, which is a balanced tree of depth 1 rooted at node v2 = 1. At time t = 3, the adaptive diffusion protocol has two choices, either to pass the virtual source token to one of node 1's neighbors that is not a previous virtual source, for example node 2 ( Figure 5 left) , or to keep the virtual source at node 1 ( Figure 5 right) . In the former case, it again takes two timesteps to spread infection to G4, which is a balanced tree of depth 2 rooted at node v4 = 2. In the latter case, only one timestep is required, but we add a unit time delay to be consistent with the previous case. Hence, G3 = G4 which is a balanced tree of depth 2 rooted at node v4 = 1. This random infection process can be defined as a time-inhomogeneous (time-dependent) Markov chain over the state defined by the location of the current virtual source {vt} t∈{0,2,4,...} .
By the symmetry of the underlying contact network (which we assume is an infinite d-regular tree) and the fact that the next virtual source is chosen uniformly at random among the neighbors of the current virtual source, it is sufficient to consider a Markov chain over the hop distance between the true source v * and vt, the virtual source at time t. Therefore, we design a Markov chain over the state
for even t. Figure 5 shows an example with (h2, h4) = (1, 2) on the left and (h2, h4) = (1, 1) on the right. G G Figure 5 : Adaptive diffusion over regular trees. Yellow nodes indicate the set of virtual sources (past and present), and for T = 4, the virtual source node is outlined in red.
At every even timestep, the protocol randomly determines whether to keep the virtual source token (ht+2 = ht) or to pass it (ht+2 = ht + 1). Using ideas from Section 2.1, we will construct an time-inhomogeneous Markov chain over {ht} t∈{2,4,6,...} by choosing appropriate transition probabilities as a function of time t and current state ht. For an even t, we denote this probability by
where the subscript d denotes the degree of the underlying contact network. For the running example, at t = 2, the virtual source remains at the current node (right) with probability α3(2, 1), or passes the virtual source to a neighbor with probability 1 − α3(2, 1) (left). The parameters α d (t, h) fully describe the transition probability of the Markov chain defined over ht ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t/2}. Let
h ] h∈{1,...,t/2} denote the distribution of the state of the Markov chain at time t, i.e. p (t) h = P(ht = h). The state transition can be represented as the following ((t/2) + 1) × (t/2) dimensional column stochastic matrices:
We treat h t as strictly positive, because at time t = 0, when h0 = 0, the virtual source is always passed. Thus, ht ≥ 1 afterwards. We design the the parameters α d (t, h) to achieve perfect hiding. Precisely, at all even t, we desire p (t) to be
. . .
for d > 2 and for d = 2, p (t) = (2/t)1 t/2 where 1 t/2 is all ones vector in R t/2 . There are d(d − 1) h−1 nodes at distance h from the virtual source, and by symmetry all of them are equally likely to have been the source:
, which is independent of h. Hence, all the infected nodes (except for the virtual source) are equally likely to have been the source of the origin. This statement is made precise in Equation (14) . Together with the desired probability distribution in Equation (11), this gives a recursion over t and h for computing the appropriate α d (t, h)'s. After some algebra and an initial state p (2) = 1, we get that the following choice ensures the desired Equation (11):
With this choice of parameters, we show that adaptive diffusion spreads fast, infecting Nt = O((d − 1) t/2 ) nodes at time t and each of the nodes except for the virtual source is equally likely to have been the source. 
(c) the expected hop-distance between the true source v *
and its estimatevML under maximum likelihood estimation is lower bounded by
Protocol 1 describes the details of the implementation of adaptive diffusion. The first three steps are always the same. At time t = 1, the rumor source v * selects, uniformly at random, one of its neighbors to be the virtual source v2 and passes the message to it. Next at t = 2, the new virtual source v2 infects all its uninfected neighbors forming G2 (see Figure 5 ). Then node v2 chooses to either keep the virtual source token with probability α d (2, 1) or to pass it along.
If v2 chooses to remain the virtual source i.e., v4 = v2, it passes 'infection messages' to all the leaf nodes in the infected subtree, telling each leaf to infect all its uninfected neighbors. Since the virtual source is not connected to the leaf nodes in the infected subtree, these infection messages get relayed by the interior nodes of the subtree. This leads to Nt messages getting passed in total (we assume this happens instantaneously). These messages cause the rumor to spread symmetrically in all directions at t = 3. At t = 4, no more spreading occurs.
If v2 does not choose to remain the virtual source, it passes the virtual source token to a randomly chosen neighbor v4, excluding the previous virtual source (in this example, v0). Thus, if the virtual source moves, it moves away from the true source by one hop. Once v4 receives the virtual source token, it sends out infection messages. However, these messages do not get passed back in the direction of the previous virtual source. This causes the infection to spread asymmetrically over only one subtree of the infected graph (G3 in left panel of Figure 5 ). In the subsequent timestep (t = 4), the virtual source remains fixed and passes the same infection messages again. After this second round of asymmetric spreading, the infected graph is once again symmetric about the virtual source v4 (G4 in left panel of Figure 5 ).
Although adaptive diffusion obfuscates the source on infinite regular trees, real world contact networks have cycles, and degrees are irregular, and the size is finite. We study how adaptive diffusion works under more realistic contact networks.
Protocol 1 Adaptive Diffusion
vt−1 selects a random variable X ∼ U (0, 1) 9:
for all v ∈ N (vt−1) do 11:
Infection Message(G,vt−1,v,Gt) 12: 
GENERAL CONTACT NETWORKS
We study adaptive diffusion on general networks when the underlying graph is cyclic, irregular, and finite.
Irregular tree networks
We first consider tree networks with potentially different degrees at the vertices. Although the degrees are irregular, we still apply adaptive diffusion with α d 0 (t, h)'s chosen for a specific d0 that might be mismatched with the graph due to degree irregularities. There are a few challenges in this degree-mismatched adaptive diffusion. First, finding the maximum likelihood estimate of the source is not immediate, due to degree irregularities. Second, it is not clear a priori which choice of d0 is good. We first show an efficient message-passing algorithm for computing the maximum likelihood source estimate. Using this estimate, we illustrate through simulations how adaptive diffusion performs and show that the detection probability is not too sensitive to the choice of d0 as long as d0 is above a threshold that depends on the degree distribution.
Efficient ML estimation. To keep the discussion simple, we assume that T is even. The same approach can be naturally extended to odd T . Since the spreading pattern in adaptive diffusion is entirely deterministic given the sequence of virtual sources at each timestep, computing the likelihood P(GT |v * = v) is equivalent to computing the probability of the virtual source moving from v to vT over T timesteps. On trees, there is only one path from v to vT and since we do not allow the virtual source to "back-track", we only need to compute the probability of every virtual source sequence (v0, v2, . . . , vT ) that meets the constraint v0 = v. Due to the Markov property exhibited by adaptive diffusion, we have P (GT |{(vt, ht)} t∈{2,4 ,...,T } ) = t<T −1 t even P(vt+2|vt, ht), where ht = δH (v0, vt). For t even,
otherwise. Here deg(vt) denotes the degree of node vt in G. Given a virtual source trajectory P = (v0, v2, . . . , vT ) , let  JP = (j1, . . . , j δ H (v 0 ,v T ) ) denote the timesteps at which a new virtual source is introduced, with 1 ≤ ji ≤ T . It always holds that j1 = 2 because after t = 0, the true source chooses a new virtual source and v2 = v0. If the virtual source at t = 2 were to keep the token exactly once after receiving it (so v2 = v4), then j2 = 6, and so forth. To find the likelihood of a node being the true source, we sum over all such trajectories
where is the indicator function and S(v0, vT , T ) = {P : P = (v0, v2, . . . , vT ) is a valid trajectory of the virtual source}. Intuitively, part Av 0 of the above expression is the probability of choosing the set of virtual sources specified by P, and part Bv 0 is the probability of keeping or passing the virtual source token at the specified timesteps. Equation (16) holds for both regular and irregular trees. Since the path between two nodes in a tree is unique, and part Av 0 is (approximately) the product of node degrees in that path, Av 0 is identical for all trajectories P. Pulling Av 0 out of the summation, we wish to compute the summation over all valid paths P of part Bv 0 (for ease of exposition, we will use Bv 0 to refer to this whole summation). Although there are combinatorially many valid paths, we can simplify the formula in Equation (16) 
whereṽT is the (Jordan) center of the infected subtreeGT , p(ṽT , v) is the unique path fromṽT to v, and deg(v ) is the degree of node v .
To understand this proposition, consider Figure 6 , which was spread using adaptive diffusion (Protocol 1) with a choice of d0 = 2. Then Equation (17) can be computed easily for each node, giving [1/2, 1, 0, 1, 2/3, 1/2, 1/2, 1/4] for nodes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], respectively. Hence, nodes 2 and 4 are most likely. Intuitively, nodes whose path to the center have small degrees are more likely. However, if we repeat this estimation assuming d0 = 4, then Equation (17) gives [3, 2, 0, 2, 4/3, 3, 3, 3/2]. In this case, nodes 1, 6, and 7 are most likely. When d0 is large, adaptive diffusion tends to place the source closer to the leaves of the infected subtree, so leaf nodes are more likely to have been the source. Proof of Proposition 4.1. We first make two observations: (a) Over regular trees, P(GT |u) = P(GT |w) for any u = w ∈ GT , even if they are different distances from the virtual souce. (b) Part Bv 0 is identical for regular and irregular graphs, as long as the distance from the candidate source node to vT is the same in both, and the same d0 is used to compute α d 0 (t, h). That is, letGT denote an infected subtree over an irregular tree network, with virtual sourceṽT , and GT will denote a regular infected subtree with virtual source vT . For candidate sourcesṽ0 ∈GT and v0 ∈ GT , if δH (ṽT ,ṽ0) = δH (vT , v0) = h, then Bv 0 = Bṽ 0 . So to find the likelihood ofṽ0 ∈GT , we can solve for Bṽ 0 using the likelihood of v0 ∈ GT , and compute Aṽ 0 using the degree information of every node in the infected, irregular subgraph.
To solve for Bṽ 0 , note that over regular graphs,
, where d0 is the degree of the regular graph. If G is a regular tree, Equation (16) still applies. Critically, for regular trees, the α d 0 (t, h)'s are designed such that the likelihood of each node being the true source is equal. Hence,
is a constant that does not depend on v 0. This gives
. From observation (b), we have that Bṽ 0 = Bv 0 . Thus we get that for aṽ0 ∈GT \ {ṽT },
After scaling appropriately and noting that |p(ṽ T ,ṽ0)| = δH (ṽT ,ṽ0) + 1, this gives the formula in Equation (17) .
Implementation and numerical simulations. We provide an efficient message passing algorithm for computing the ML estimate in Equation (17), which is naturally distributed. We then use this estimator to simulate message spreading for random irregular trees and show that when d0 exceeds a threshold (determined by the degree distribution), obfuscation is not too sensitive to the choice of d0. Aṽ 0 can be computed efficiently for irregular graphs with a simple message-passing algorithm. In this algorithm, each Algorithm 2 ML estimator of (17) Input: infected networkGT = (ṼT ,ẼT ), virtual sourceṽT , time T , the spreading model parameter d0 Output: argmaxṽ ∈Ṽ T P(GT |ṽ * =ṽ)
for allw ∈ N (ṽ) \ {ũ} do 13:
ifṽ =ũ then 14:
Aw ← Aṽ/deg(w) 15:
Degree Message(GT ,ṽ,w, A) 16:
ifṽ is not a leaf then 18:
Degree Message(GT ,ṽ,w, A) return A nodeṽ multiplies its degree information by a cumulative likelihood that gets passed from the virtual source to the leaves. Thus if there areÑT infected nodes inGT , then Aṽ 0 for everyṽ0 ∈GT can be computed by passing O(ÑT ) messages. This message-passing is outlined in procedure 'Degree Message' of Algorithm 2. For example, consider computing A5 for the graph in Figure 6 . The virtual sourceṽT = 3 starts by setting A2 = .This step is applied recursively until reaching the leaves.
As discussed earlier, Bṽ 0 only depends on d0 and δH (ṽT ,ṽ0). If v leaf ∈ GT is a leaf node and G is a regular tree, we get
Ifṽ0 is h < T/2 hops fromṽT , then for node v0 with δH (v0, vT ) = h < T/2 over a regular tree,
Finally, Bṽ 0 = Bv 0 . So to solve for B5 in our example, we compute P(GT |v leaf ) for a 3-regular graph at time T = 4. This gives P(G4|v leaf ) = Av leaf · Bv leaf = 1 6
. This gives P(G4|5) = A5 · B5 = 1 9
. The same can be done for other nodes in the graph to find the maximum likelihood source estimate. We tested adaptive diffusion over random trees; each node's degree was drawn i.i.d. from a fixed distribution. Figure 7 illustrates simulation results for random trees in which each node has degree 3 or 4 with equal probability, averaged over 100,000 trials. By the law of large numbers, the number of nodes infected scales as NT = e T E[log(D−1)] ∼ 2.45 T , where D represents the degree distribution of the underlying random irregular tree. The value of d0 corresponds to a regular tree with size scaling as (d0 − 1)
T . Hence, one can expect that for d0 − 1 < 2.45, the source is likely to be in the center of the infection, and for d0 > 2.45 the source is likely to be at the boundary of the infection. Since the number of nodes in the boundary is significantly larger than the number of nodes in the center, the detection probability is lower for d0 − 1 > 2.45. This is illustrated in the figure, which matches our prediction. In general, d0 = 1 + e E[log(D−1)] provides the best obfuscation, and it is robust for any value above that. In this plot, data points represent successive even timesteps; their uniform spacing implies the message is spreading exponentially quickly. Figure 8 illustrates the probability of detection as a function of infection size while varying the degree distribution of the underlying tree. The notation (3, 5) => (0.5, 0.5) in the legend indicates that each node in the tree has degree 3 or 5, each with probability 0.5. For each distribution tested, we chose d0 to be the maximum degree of each degree distribution. The average size of infection scales as NT = e T E[log(D−1)] as expected, whereas the probability of detection scales as (dmin − 1) −T = 2 −T , which is independent of the degree distribution. This suggests that adaptive diffusion fails to provide near-perfect obfuscation when the underlying graph is irregular, and the gap increases with the irregularity of the graph.
Real World Networks
To understand how adaptive diffusion fares in realistic scenarios that involve cycles, irregular degrees, and finite graph size, we ran the adaptive diffusion protocol over an underlying connectivity network of 10,000 Facebook users in New Orleans circa 2009, as described by the Facebook WOSN dataset [22] . We eliminated all nodes with fewer than three friends (this approach is taken by several existing anonymous applications so users cannot guess which of their friends originated the message), which left us with a network of 9,502 users. Over this underlying network, we selected a node uniformly at random as the rumor source, and spread the message using adaptive diffusion setting with d0 = ∞, which means that the virtual source is always passed to a new node. This choice is to make the ML source estimation faster, and other choices of d0 could outperform this naive choice. To preserve the symmetry of our constructed trees as much as possible, we constrained each infected node to infect a maximum of three other nodes in each timestep. We also give the adversary access to the undirected infection subtree that explicitly identifies all pairs of nodes for which one node spread the infection to the other. This subtree is overlaid on the underlying contact network, which is not necessarily tree-structured. We demonstrate in simulation ( Figure 9 ) that even with this strong side information, the adversary can only identify the true message source with low probability.
Using the naive method of enumerating every possible message trajectory, it is computationally expensive to find the exact ML source estimate since there are 2 T possible trajectories, depending on whether the virtual source stayed or moved at each timestep. If the true source is one of the leaves, we can closely approximate the ML estimate among all leaf nodes, using the same procedure as described in 4.1, with one small modification: in graphs with cycles, the term (deg(vj k )−1) from equation (16) should be substituted with (deg u (vj k )−1), where deg u (vj k ) denotes the number of uninfected neighbors of vj k at time j k . Loops in the graph cause this value to be time-varying, and also dependent on the location of v0, the candidate source. We did not approximate the ML estimate for non-leaves because the simplifications used in Section 4.1 to compute the likelihood no longer hold, leading to an exponential increase in the problem dimension. This approach is only an approximation of the ML estimate because the virtual source could move in a loop over the social graph (i.e., the same node could be the virtual source more than once, in nonadjacent timesteps).
On average, adaptive diffusion reached 96 percent of the network within 10 timesteps using d0 = 4. We also computed the average distance of the true source from the estimated source over the infected subtree (Figure 10 ). We see that as time progresses, so does the hop distance of the estimated source from the true source. In social networks, nearly everyone is within a small number of hops (say, 6 hops [21] ) from everyone else, so this computation is not as informative in this setting. However, it is relevant in location-based connectivity graphs, which can induce large hop distances between nodes.
DISCUSSION
Besides the adversarial model studied in this paper, anonymous messaging applications face challenges under alternative adversarial models that can occur in practice. Examples include (a) an adversary that corrupts a subset of network nodes through malware, bribery, or Sybil node creation in order to access metadata like message timing and sender identity; (b) an adversary that prevents nodes from following the messaging protocol (e.g., via malware); or (c) an adversarial network provider that monitor all network activity and analyzes this activity retroactively.
All these adversarial attacks increase the chance of source identification, which is a challenging problem for designing anonymous protocols. To a large extent, de-anonymization is an arms race in which there is always side information for an adversary to exploit. The point is to make that exploitation as expensive and difficult as possible, thereby preventing it from scaling. Within this arms race, anonymous spreading protocols ensure that adversaries cannot use message propagation patterns as a weapon.
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Protocol 3 Spreading on a line
Require contact network G = (V, E) formly at random, one of its neighboring nodes (say node u) and passes the updated state variables s1,u = 1 and s2,u = 1 along with the message to u. The first state s1,u = 1 indicates that node u is one of the 'virtual sources'. The second state s2,u = 1 indicates that node u will eventually be at height 1 in the infected subtree. Afterwards, the protocol iterates the following procedures. Any infected node v that is not a future virtual source creates 'offsprings' that are not virtual sources (s 1,v = 0) and have heights decreased by one (s 1,v = s1,v −1). Any node v with height zero (i.e., s2,v = 0) stops spreading the infection in order to ensure that v and the true source are at the same depth from the center of Gt for any t. An infected node v that is a future virtual source proceeds similarly, with one difference: it chooses one of its neighbors to be a virtual source with the second state incremented by one, i.e. s 2,v = s2,v + 1. Protocol 4 summarizes this process and Figure 4 illustrates that if the contact network is a regular tree, this process keeps the infected subtree balanced and regular, with the true source hiding among the leaves. Figure 4 shows an example of this spreading algorithm. At time t = 0, node v * = 0 starts spreading a rumor in the network. At t = 1, node 0 infects node 1 and sets s1,1 = 1 and s2,1 = 1. At t = 2, node 1 infects node 3 and sets s1,3 = 0 and s2,3 = 0. Node 1 also infects node 2 and sets s1,2 = 1 and s2,2 = 2. At t = 3, node 2 infects node 4 and sets s1,4 = 0 and s2,4 = 1. Node 2 also infects node 5 and sets s1,5 = 1 and s2,5 = 3. Observe that node 3 will not infect any of its neighbors because s1,3 = 0 and s2,3 = 0.
by sending a state information along with the message. Each infected node u keeps two state variables: a binary variable s1,u ∈ {0, 1} and a non-negative integer s2,u ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , t}. The binary state s1,u marks the future virtual sources of the infected subtree; if s1,u = 1, then node u will be the Jordan center of the graph at some point in the future. The integer state s2,u keeps track of the eventual 'height' of node u in the infected subtree. In the example above, node 3 will always be at the leaf, so it has s2,3 = 0, where as node 9 is currently a leaf, but eventually will be at height 2 and has s2,9 = 2, since node 5 will be at some point a center of infected subtree of depth 3. These state variables are computed for each node when it is infected, and is constant over time.
B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.1
Spreading rate. Consider the following time-dependent random walk on N0 = {0, 1, . . .}. Let xt be the position of a black dot at time t and assume that x0 = 0. At time t ≥ 1, the dot can either move to the right: xt = xt−1 + 1 with probability p(t, xt−1) = (xt−1 + 1)/(t + 1); or stay where it is: xt = xt−1 with probability q(t, xt−1) = 1 − p(t, xt−1). We claim that P (xT = k) = 1/(T + 1), for k ∈ {0, . . . , T }. We will prove this by induction on T . Observe that for T = 1, x1 = x0 + 1 = 1 with probability 1/2 and x1 = 0 with probability 1/2. Therefore, the claim is true for T = 1. Assume it is true for T − 1. At t = T , P (xT = 0) = P (xT −1 = 0) 1 − 1 T + 1 = 1 T + 1 P (xT = T ) = P (xT −1 = T ) T T + 1 = 1 T + 1
